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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS "NORMAL
SCIENCE"
Toni M. Massaro*
An enduring feature of equal protection and substantive
due process review of government action is being lost in much
contemporary discourse: these challenges usually fail. Claims
that the current Court is exceptionally activist are belied by its
track record in this arena. The Justices interpret substantive due
process and equal protection rights very narrowly, and protect
citizens only from exceptionally egregious, biased, intrusive, or
irrational government action. 1 Most government follies easily
withstand equal protection and substantive due process review.
Although the Court plainly does intervene in important contexts, actual cases are unusual, emerge slowly, and hew to settled
principles as far as possible.
The 2002 Term displayed this pattern beautifully. The Court
decided several substantive due process and equal protection
cases and -characteristically- upheld the government's action
in most of them, despite impressive evidence of irrationality. 2 In
two of the decisions, it did so unanimously and unceremoniously.3 It allowed doctrine to evolve with the times in three other

* Dean and Milton 0. Riepe Chair in Constitutional Law, University of Arizona
James E. Rogers College of Law, Tucson. Warm thanks go to David Adelman, Graeme
Austin, Barbara Babcock, Jim Chen, Tom Grey, Bernard Harcourt, and Genevieve
Leavitt, for feedback on this essay, and to Christopher Goodman for his able research
assistance. As usual, they are to be thanked, not blamed. Special thanks go to the members of the Dean's Council, who provide generous support for academic research at the
College.
1. I say this well aware of the civil rights remedy limitations that such narrow constructions imply after City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See, e.g., Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001). But see Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1984
(2003) (upholding congressional power to enact the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.
2612(a)(1 )(c)(2000)).
2. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244(2003); Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent.
Iowa, 123 S. Ct. 2156 (2003); City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope
Found., 123 S. Ct. 1389 (2003).
3. See Buckeye, 123 S. Ct. at 1391; Racing Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2161.
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decisions, but these modifications were predictable and within
the plausible reach of settled principles.
The Court decided the equal protection and substantive due
process cases through a hybrid mixture of formulas and pragmatism-not with pure formulas or pure pragmatism. The method
is formulaic at its core and cautiously dynamic and nonformulaic on its periphery. The doctrine moves incrementally
with evolving social, political, and philosophical shifts in American culture, and contains very few surprises. Although the Court
occasionally reaches decisions that effect a significant change in
the application of fundamental principles, the Court makes no
quantum leaps and rarely modifies the fundamental principles
themselves. As Dan Farber has observed, constitutional law is
"normal science," 4 not radical science. Simulating the common
law process of decision-making, the Justices invoke available
doctrinal support for shifts. They seek to cabin the impact of any
changes, and they emphasize the limited role that the Court realistically can, and constitutionally should, play in shaping public
policy. When a Court decision proves to be a tipping point for a
new cultural trend, this is because the conditions for such change
are ripe, not because the Court alone effects, in parthenogenetic
bursts, extreme cultural reforms.
When outrage erupts over Court decisions- as it did in 2003
over the same-sex sodomy and affirmative action cases- it is because the issues are vigorously contested, have great emotional
content, and could go either way under applicable doctrinal
standards. It is not because the Court forges doctrine willy nilly.
A Court run so amuck, mindful of no doctrinal tethers, would
inspire impeachment efforts or demands that we pitch judicial
review altogether-steps that very few serious commentators believe are justified. In sum, the sky is not falling over our democratic institutions; nor are the heavens opening for individual liberty.
The 2002 term offered a perfect illustration of how this
modest, incrementalist approach to doctrinal evolution can spark
angry howls of judicial activism. In Grutter v. Bollinger' and

4. See Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986)
(citing Thomas Kuhn's famous definition of normal science as "research firmly based
upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its future practice."
THOMAS KUHN, THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1970)).
5. 539 U.S. 306(2003).
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Gratz v. Bollinger, 6 the Court reviewed two race-conscious university admissions policies. 7 The Court upheld one of them and
struck down the other, sparking acid reactions in some corridors
and jubilation in others.
The split outcomes, though, were both predictable and reasonably supportable as a matter of precedent and public policy.
The Court had suggested, before Grutter and Gratz that only
very narrowly tailored remedial measures or "social emergencies" justify race-conscious measures. The Court had been particularly hostile to racial "quotas" or "set-asides,"8 but it also had
insisted that strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal. 9 Moreover, the
case law denouncing quotas had always been tempered by other
official practices-including practices of the federal government
-that continued to underscore the significance of raceconscious goals, to stress the importance of diversity, and to use
race-sensitive statistics to achieve these goals. 10 In Grutter and
Gratz, the Court ended some of the uncertainty about the validity of these enduring practices by agreeing that achieving diversity among students within a university is a compelling goal that
can be advanced through narrowly tailored race-conscious
measures. 11
In doing so, the Court also reinforced core principles of Justice Powell's opinion in University of California Regents v.
Bakke, 12 on which countless educational institutions have relied
since 1978. Grutter and Gratz allowed these practices to continue, but only within specific guidelines. The Court in Grutter
likewise pointed to the briefs filed by business and military leaders, who maintained that race-conscious diversity remains essential in their domains. 13 At the same time, the Court warned that
diversity measures must be carefully crafted to advance their
6. 539 U.S. 244(2003).
7. /d. at 252; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310.
8. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
9. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
10. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. Pt. 100.3 ("In administering a program regarding which the
recipient has previously discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, the recipient must take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior
dtscnmmatwn"); 29 C.F.R. _§ 1608.4 (encouraging and protecting voluntary affirmative
actwn to tmprove opportumlles for women and minorities, and accepts "goals and timetables" if reasonably related to listed outcomes).
11. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
12. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 (Powell, J.).
13. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31.
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goals and may not reach farther in time or scope than necessary.14
In sum, the Court juggled complex doctrinal and practical
concerns and sought to create as little disruption as possible. It
deferred to educator, military, and business leaders' opinions
about real-world consequences. It preserved fractured judicial
precedent, insofar as possible. It placed substantial limits on the
future use of race conscious measure. And it settled an issue that
had split the nation, and the lower courts, in ways that demanded Supreme Court attention. The Court nevertheless took
a scolding from many critics, both for the approach and for the
results.
The Justices straddled a similar set of concerns in Lawrence
v. Texas. 15 Five Justices held that a Texas law that prohibited
same-sex sodomy violated substantive due process. 16 This decision Lawrence clearly represented a significant doctrinal progression. The majority noted the evolution of public mores about
homosexuality, both nationally and internationally,17 and invoked case law reaching back to the 1960s to support the result. 18
The sixth vote to strike down the statute-cast by Court centrist
Justice O'Connor-relied on equal protection reasoning from
Romer v. Evans. 19 Again, however, the case was hardly radical in
terms of the Judicial method or doctrinal progression. It nevertheless has become an emotional focal point for political conservatives and for those who condemn dynamic interpretations of
the Constitution.
Significantly, the Court easily upheld government actions
against equal protection and substantive due process challenges
in two other cases during the 2002 term, both of which escaped
media attention entirely. 20 Yet these unnoticed cases offer important evidence that the Justices have not abandoned the traditional, weighty presumption against overturning government action. On the contrary, they continue to exercise this power very
sparingly. The absence of bright lines on the doctrinal margins
and the transgression of lines in isolated cases do not obliterate
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

!d. at 333-34.
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
!d. at 2476.
!d. at 2481.
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Romer v. Evans,
517 u.s. 620 (1996)).
20. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 123 S. Ct. 2156 (2003); City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 123 S. Ct. 1389 (2003).
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all meaningful lines. They mean that the Court eschews both
hidebound formalism and free-form activism, much to the chagrin of critics from the political right and the political left.
This Essay takes aim at critics who argue for more formalism from the Court and who insist that the Justices disregard the
limits of the Constitution and of judicial authority when they extend equal protection or substantive due process protections to
new terrains. The Court's limited version of interpretive dynamism is consistent with past practices and necessary to prevent
"legal petrification." 21 In practice, this dynamism is greatly tempered by the many practical and constitutional limits on judicial
review and by the centrist-to-very conservative composition of
the federal judiciary. The increasingly popular indictment of the
Court as a group of "wide-eyed activists" is terribly misleading,
if not dangerous for judicial independence.
I limit my inquiry here to only two constitutional rights and
to October Term 2002, because the treatment of these rights
during that Term offers a useful barometer of the Court's alleged judicial activism in exceptionally charged areas of constitutional law.l begin with the unremarkable decisions, where the
Court used its customary, blunt-lined rational basis test. I follow
with a summary of the provocative cases, where the Court's dynamism becomes apparent and doctrinal lines and formalist
methods blur. If one looks across the whole spectrum of cases,
one sees that the Court uses both formalism and dynamism, but
that formalism plainly is the rule, not the exception.The combination allows the Court to occasionally adopt new perspectives
on traditional constitutional principles without having to abandon the principles themselves.
I. UNDER THE MEDIA RADAR: RACING

ASSOCIATION AND BUCKEYE

Although the affirmative action and sodomy cases dominated the 2002 Term and riveted a national audience, their doctrinal impact was softened by cases that received scant or no
public attention. I highlight two of these sleepers. Such cases
prove that equal protection and substantive due process doctrine
remain unaltered at their cores.

21.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,770 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).

552

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:547

A. RACING ASSOCIATION
The first example of judicial business as usual was Fitzgerald
v. Racing Association of Central Iowa.Z 2 Racing Association involved a challenge to Iowa's disparate tax treatment of slot machines on excursion riverboats, relative to vis-a-vis slot machines
at racetracks. 23 Iowa taxed the adjusted revenues from slots on
riverboats at a maximum rate of 20 percent. In contrast, under a
1994 amendment to its laws, Iowa allowed racetracks to operate
slot machines, but taxed adjusted revenues from those racetrack
slots at a maximum rate of 36 percent. 24 The racetrack owners
brought suit, challenging the higher maximum tax rates as a violation of equal protection. 25
The Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that the differential
was irrational because the higher maximum rate for racetrack
slots defeated the alleged purpose of the 1994 law: to help racetracks recover from economic distress. 26 It thus struck down the
measure on equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court of the
United States disagreed. In a brief and unanimous opinion for
the Court, Justice Breyer rehearsed the most familiar version of
rational basis analysis,27 in which tremendous deference is accorded government action. First, there must be a plausible policy
reason for a classification. Second, the legislative facts on which
the classification appears to be based rationally may have been
considered to be true by the governmental decision-maker.
Third and finally, the relationship of the classification to its goal
must not be so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary
or irrational. 28
Classifications rarely flunk this traditional version of the rational basis test. They surely do not flunk the test, the Court
noted, when the classification advances one goal but also serves
another desirable (perhaps even contrary) end. As Justice
Breyer stated, "if every subsidiary provision in a law designed to
help racetracks had to help those racetracks and nothing more,
then (since any tax rate hurts the racetracks when compared

22. 123 S. Ct. at 2156.
23. !d.
24. /d. at 2158.
25. /d.
26. /d.
27. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); Heller
v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,319-20 (1993).
28. Racing Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2159.
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with a lower rate) there could be no taxation of the racetracks at
all. ,z9
Justice Breyer then contrasted the tax differential in Racing
Association with tax differentials based upon race, gender, instate versus out-of-state status, or length of residenc{u. All of
these, he noted, would have triggered elevated scrutiny. 0
B.

BUCKEYE

In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope
Foundation, 31 the Court likewise used the conventional rational
basis approach, though on a set of facts less obviously suited for
uncritical deference to government. The issue in Buckeye was
whether the Sixth Circuit erred in ruling that a race discrimination suit against the City could proceed to trial. 32 The primary
evidence of discrimination was that the City had submitted a facially neutral referendum petition to the voters that called for
repeal of an ordinance authorizing construction of low-income
housing, after public opposition to the housing project arose. 33 A
nonprofit corporation dedicated to developing affordable lowincome housing challenged the City's action on the ground that
it gave effect to racial bias reflected in public opposition to the
housing project. By submitting the petition to voters and refusing to issue building permits while the petition was pending, the
City allegedly violated the Equal Protection Clause. 34
The Court-again unanimously-rejected this equal protection argument. Justice O'Connor noted that there must be proof
of government intent to discriminate?5 The official act at issuethe referendum petitioning process-reflected no intent to discriminate. That process was consistent with the City charter,
which was facially neutral. 36 The referendum itself was placed on
the ballot by the City, but not enacted by it. 37 The City engineer's refusal to issue building permits while the petition was
pending was a nondiscretionary, ministerial act. 38 There was no

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

!d.
Id.
123 S. Ct. 1389 (2003).
Id. at 1394.
ld. at 1393.
ld.
!d. at 1394; see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Buckeye, 123 S. Ct. at 1395.
ld.
ld. at 1396.
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evidence that any of these official acts was motivated by racial
animus or constituted selective enforcement of charter procedures.39
Although private citizens expressed racial animus, and although some voters may have acted on racial animus, this did
not of itself constitute "state action" sufficient to trigger equal
protection review. Nor was there evidence that the City officials
and private citizens had acted in concert, or that the former
somehow exercised coercive power over the latter's decisions. 40
The Court in Buckeye likewise rejected the argument that
the City's actions violated substantive due process. 41 The corporation argued that because the City had already approved site
plans for the low-income housing project, the corporation had a
property interest in those permits. According to the corporation,
the City arbitrarily denied the corporation the benefit of its site
plan, and the submission of an administrative, land-use determination to the charter's referendum process was per se arbitrary
conduct. 42
The Court never reached the question of whether the respondents had a property interest in the building permits. It concluded instead that the City engineer did not act arbitrarily in
deciding not to issue the petitions while the referendum was
pending. 43 Only the most egregious government action violates
substantive due process. Given the language of the City charter
that no ordinance challenged by a petition could go into effect
until approved by a majority of those voting thereon, the refusal
to issue the permit in the interim was deemed sensible.44
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that administrative
matters could not be submitted to the referendum process. 45 Under City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, voters retain the
power to govern through referendum with respect to any matter-legislative or administrative-within the realm of local affairs.46

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

/d. at 1395-96.
!d. at 1395.
/d. at 1396.
!d.
/d.
!d.
!d.
426 U.S. 668,676 (1976).
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Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred. 47 His
concurrence was focused on the substantive due process portion
of the majority opinion. Justice Scalia has long opposed any expansion of substantive due process. Short of abolishing the doctrine-his clearly preferred outcome-he favors cabining it. He
thus admires Graham v. Connor, 48 which held that substantive
due process analysis is precluded whenever a "more specific"
constitutional provision governs the same case. According to
Justice Scalia, a more specific test in Buckrye did govern the corporation's claim of an arbitrary deprivation of its nonfundamentalliberty interest-the equal protection clause.49 Thus, no substantive due process claim should have been available, let alone
successful.
This part of Justice Scalia's concurrence is worth highlighting for two reasons. First, Justice Scalia is quite correct that
Graham poses a logical block to a substantive due process claim.
But, as I have stated elsewhere, Graham itself is an illogical departure from the Court's customar6' method of interpreting overlapping constitutional provisions. 5 Given that only one Justice
joined Justice Scalia's concurrence in Buckeye, and none of the
others even responded to his Graham-based argument, the
Court evidently does not apply Graham outside of the narrow
criminal procedure context in which it arose. I regard this as excellent news.
Justice Scalia's concurrence also indicates that he was aware
of Graham during the 2002 Term. Yet even he made no mention
of Graham in any other case last term. In particular, Justice
Scalia made no reference to Graham in Lawrence, though Lawrence was decided only months after Buckeye. 51 Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence relied expressly upon
equal protection rather than substantive due process,52 and Justice Kennedy noted in his majority opinion that equal protection
and substantive due process are "linked in important respects,
and a decision on the latter point advances both interests. "53 If
they are so interrelated, one wonders, what happens to the Gra47. Buckeye, 123 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., concurring).
48. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
49. Buckeye, 123 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. See Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black?The Court's "lot for lot" Account
of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1110-21 (1998).
51. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472 (decided June 26, 2003); Buckeye, 123 S. Ct. at 1389
(decided March 25, 2003).
52. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. !d. at 2472.
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ham principle invoked by Justice Scalia in Buckeye? Why did
Graham catch Justice Scalia's attention in one case but not the
other?
The answer, I submit, is that context matters-context affects not only how substantive due process and equal protection
principles are applied, but even whether they are applied. One
need not look forward or backward to see how context affects
the way the Justices shape doctrine, including a Justice who is
acutely aware of and committed to avoiding such analytical discontinuities. In practice, the kind of strong doctrinal consistency
and formalism that Justice Scalia desires cannot be observed
across opinions within a single Term, or even across the opinions
of one Justice -let alone across opinions written across a span of
decades, which entail changing Justices, times, and events. To insist upon consistency of this order is to insist upon a chimera.
Formalism is especially unhelpful on the margins of doctrine,
where the influence of social, political, technological and cultural
changes is most visible and powerful.

IMPLICATIONS
Taken together, Racing Association and Buckeye suggest
that even relatively easy equal protection and substantive due
process cases occasionally earn Supreme Court attention. When
they do, the Court-to a Justice-treats the cases summarily,
with standard formulations of rational basis review. They also
indicate that although judicial oversight of routine government
acts may occur with some frequency, judicial overturns occur
rarely-even in cases that raise the specter of racial bias. Racing
Association and Buckeye are the norm, not the exception. They
reinforce the doctrinal order and rigorous restraint that the traditional rational basis test represents.
Rational basis review can produce upsets-as the 2002
Term also proves. But this is not because rational basis, traditionally understood, has withered on the vine. The upsets tend to
occur in cases where the Court refuses to identify a new classification as "suspect" or name a new "fundamental" right, but nevertheless is disturbed by the parallels to such categories. The result is a handful of cases-not a torrent-in which evidence of
irrationality persuades the Court to intervene while refusing to
adopt an across-the-board new category for elevated scrutiny.
The Court stretches "rational basis" beyond the typical-some
would say plausible-limits, and reaches results that suggest that
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a more searching standard of review actually has been conducted.54 These "stretch" cases, though, are aberrations; the
baseline, a powerful presumption against judicial overturn of
government action, still holds.
The most interesting cases, of course, are the aberrations.
Consequently, these capture media and scholarly attention. The
Court does on occasion abandon formalism in favor of methods
that are far more susceptible to nondoctrinal influences, more
disruptive of expectations, and less deferential to government
actors. When this happens, fur flies.
II. HIGH-PROFILE CASES
The Court decided three cases in the 2002 Term that attracted wide public and media attention and caused considerable
political uproar. It struck down Texas's same-sex sodomy law,55
upheld one University of Michigan affirmative action policy,56
and struck down another. 57 According to the harshest critics, this
trio of cases betrays an arrogant and elitist Court that disrespects
democracy and needs to be cabined.
Such accusations are baseless. None of these cases unduly
compromised democratic will or represented a power-drunk judiciary. All were reasonably consistent with precedent and
reached predictable and sane results. Moreover, these cases do
not stand alone, as the above discussion of Racing Association
and Buckeye shows. As a whole, the 2002 Term revealed neither
excessive "activism" nor excessive "passivity."
A. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS

I begin with the case that triggered the most ferocious and
sustained outcry from conservatives and Court critics: Lawrence
v. Texas. In Lawrence, the Court struck down a Texas law that
forbade same-sex sodomy, but not sodomy between male and
female partners. 58 Although all sophisticated Court watchers expected the Court to strike down the statute, most did not expect
54. See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 u.s. 528 (1973).
55. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472.
56. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306(2003).
57. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244(2003).
58. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
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the majority to rely on substantive due process. Fewer still anticipated that it would overrule Bowers v. Hardwick. Thus, the
case was the biggest surprise of the Term. Yet the facts of the
case actually were well suited to all of these responses, and the
judicial tools were in place to support them.
From a civil libertarian perspective, the case was a particularly compelling one for judicial intervention. Acting on a false
report of a weapons disturbance, police officers entered the private residence of John Lawrence. After the baseline entry, the
officers observed Lawrence and another adult male engaged in a
consensual sexual act. 59 Both were arrested and convicted of
"deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same
sex" in violation of a Texas statute that prohibited same-sex
sodomy. 60 Lawrence challenged the prosecution on equal protection and substantive due process grounds. 61
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lawrence and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's holding.62 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter. Justice Kennedy
concluded that the statute violated the petitioner's liberty interests under substantive due process. 63 Summarizing the case as
one that involved "two adults who, with full and mutual consent
from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to homosexuallifestyle,"64 he insisted that the men were "entitled torespect for their private lives. "65
The most significant feature of the opinion, for purposes of
this Essay, was that it openly embraced a dynamic approach to
interpreting the Constitution: "history and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point, of the substantive due process inquiry. "66 Invoking established principles
of liberty and the protection of human dignity, Kennedy noted
that the past half century "showed growing awareness that liberty protects adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 67 The Court's abortion
59.
60.
61.

62.
63.

64.

/d. at 2476.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 2484.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 2480, (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)

65.
66.
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
67. /d. at 2478.
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cases, as well earlier cases involving access to contraceptives,
protect the right to be free from governmental control over "the
most private human conduct, sexual behavior, ... in the most
private of places, the home." 68 Even if same-sex relations are not
given formal recognition in the law, Justice Kennedy concluded,
it is within the liberty of persons to choose that relationship
without being punished as criminals. 69
Justice Kennedy rejected the argument that the "right" at
stake in Lawrence was the narrow right to engage in same-sex
sodomy or in any other, specifically defined sexual conduct. To
so claim, he said, "demeaned the [petitioner's] claim, just as it
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse." 70 Rather, the
right at stake was the liberty interest of adult citizens- that is,
the right to be left alone in a private domain to engage in private
human conduct.71
Justice Kennedy denounced outright the Court's 1986 ruling
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 72 which permitted Georgia to criminalize
"homosexual sodomy" on several grounds. Bowers gave "liberty" an unduly narrow construction. 73 It did a poor job of canvassing the relevant history of criminal prosecution of same-sex
relations. 74 It placed excessive emphasis on historical practices
and tradition. 7 It wrongly used the "moral disapproval" of a majority of citizens as a primary basis for enforcing these views on
the whole society through its criminal laws. 76 Its doctrinal basis
had been eroded by later cases such as Case/ 7 and Romer. 78 Finally, it ignored competing moral and ethical standards, includ68. /d. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965)).
69. /d.
70. /d.
71. /d.
72. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 176 (1986); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 ("Bowers
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain
binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.").
73. Lawrenre, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
74. /d. at 2480 ("(T]he historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex
than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate.").
75. /d.
76. /d.
77. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
78. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620 (1996); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 ("The foundations
of Bowers have sustained serious erosion from our recent decisions in Casey and Romer.
When our precedent has been thus weakened, criticism from other sources is of greater
significance").
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ing laws in the international community. 79 These competing
standards belie the sweeping claim in Bowers that "the history of
Western civilization" and "Judeo Christian moral and ethical
standards" uniformly negate the liberty interests of consenting
same-sex adult partners acting in private. 80 In any event, constitutional notions of liberty favor protection of such conduct, not
its criminalization.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but did not
join the Court in overruling Bowers, a case in which she formed
part of the majority. 81 She concluded that the Texas ban on
same-sex sodomy, but not on opposite-sex sodomy, likely was
inspired by animus against a politically unpopular group, not by
any neutral assessment of the state's best interests. Consequently, the ban violated even rational basis review under the
equal protection clause. 82 Reviewing several equal protection
cases that apply what has been called "rational basis with bite," 83
Justice O'Connor noted that these cases tend to involve discriminatory regulations that inhibit important personal relationships. A state plainly can regulate a wide range of personal conduct, but it cannot criminalize that conduct solely for some
citizens and not others, where the reason for that distinction is
baseless animus against the burdened citizens. 84 This did not
mean that all laws that distinguish between heterosexuals and
homosexuals necessarily flunk the rational basis test of equal
protection. If a state can cite other legitimate government interests, "such as national security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage," then the rational basis requirement may be
met. 85
Justice Scalia wrote a scalding dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. 86 He first condemned the
majority for describing the petitioner's conduct as "an exercise
of liberty" without articulating what, if any, fundamental right it
entailed. 87 The majority opinion engaged in "an unheard-of form
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
/d. at 2480-81.
/d. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
/d. at 2488.
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court's 1971 Term; Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 HARY. L. REV. 1, 18-22 (1972).
84. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Romer v. Evans,

517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985);
United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
85. /d. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. /d. (Scalia, 1 ., dissenting).
87. /d.
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of rational-basis review" that Justice Scalia warned would "have
far-reaching implications beyond this case. "88 Bowers was only
seventeen years old. Although he agreed that stare decisis is not
an inexorable command, he objected to its inconsistent application.89 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 90 the Court cited popular condemnations of its precedent
as a reason to uphold the central holding of Roe v. Wade. 91 In
Lawrence, the majority pointed to condemnations of Bowers as a
reason to overrule the case. Which way, Justice Scalia grumbled,
will it be? 92
Justice Scalia was especially critical of the majority's disregard of Washington v. Glucksberg, 93 which he interprets to require that "only fundamental rights which are 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition' qualify for anything other
than rational basis scrutiny under the doctrine of 'substantive
due process. "'94 The majority in Lawrence nowhere described
same-sex sodomy per seas a fundamental right. Justice Scalia argued that the opinion thus could only be based on the "rational
basis" test and a conclusion that the Texas law furthered no legitimate state interest. 95
Echoing Lord Patrick Devlin, 96 Justice Scalia intoned that a
"governing majority's belief that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral and unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for regulation ... 97 Otherwise, laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, and
incest, too, would be of suspect constitutionality. 98 Due process
does not prevent the states from curtailing nonfundamental liberties, provided these measures satisfy the very forgiving "rational basis" test. 99 In Justice Scalia's view, Lawrence calls into
question countless laws that are based on moral intuitions of the

!d.
!d.
90. 505 u.s. 833 (1992).
91. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
92. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. !d. at 2491-92.
94. !d. at 2489 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (emphasis in original).
95. !d. at 2492.
96. See generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 86-101, (Oxford University Press 1965) (arguing for a conception of "common morality" that justifies
legislation).
97. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. !d.
99. !d. at 2493-96.
88.
89.
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regulators and may constitute a "massive disruption of the current social order. " 100
Finally, Scalia attacked both the majority's and Justice
O'Connor's reasoning more pointedly. He described the opinions as "the product of a Court, which is the product of lawprofession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called
homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by
some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct. " 101 He scolded the Court for taking "sides in the culture
war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that
the democratic rules of engagement are observed." 102 Justice
Scalia closed with the observation that he respects homosexuals'
right to promote their "agenda" through "normal democratic
means," but he believed that resolving this question is simply not
the Court's job. 103
Justice Thomas wrote a very brief dissent in which he described the Texas law as "uncommonly silly," but not unconstitutional.104 Overturning silly laws is the job of the legislature. Were
he a Texas legislator, Justice Thomas made clear, he would vote
to repeal this particular law. 105 Thus, seven Justices thought the
Texas law was irrational, but only six believed it should be overturned on constitutional grounds.
B. GRUTTER AND GRATZ

Less than a week before Lawrence was decided, the Court
handed down two other cases that likewise inspired heated criticisms from many conservatives and Court critics. The Court upheld "diversity" as a compelling reason for universities and
graduate schools to take race and ethnicity into account in admissions, as one factor among many. 106 All but Justices Thomas
100. /d. at 2491.
101. /d. at 2496.
102. /d. at 2497.
103. /d. (Justice Scalia has continued his attack on the majority opinion outside the
courtroom. In a speech before the members of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute on
October 23, 2003, he told the audience that the majority's decision ignores the Constitution in favor of "the latest academic understanding of liberal political theory." Anne
Gearan, Justice Scalia Excoriates Court's Gay Sex Ruling, (Oct. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.twincities.com/mld/pioneerpress/news/nationl7090205.htm (last visited Jan.
19, 2004)).
104. /d. at 2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
105. /d.
106. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324-25.
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and Scalia endorsed this diversity justification for race-conscious
measures. 107 The Court split sharply, however, on whether the
University of Michigan admissions policies in question were sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to survive strict scrutiny. In Grutter,
five Justices concluded that the law school admissions policy was
narrowly tailored. 108 In Gratz, six Justices concluded that undergraduate admission policy was not narrowly tailored. 109 Quite
narrow factual distinctions between the two policies drove the
split outcomes.
A redeeming feature of the law school admissions policy
was that it allowed officials to review each application individually. The law school officials took into account ways in which
each applicant might add to class diversity, including racial and
ethnic diversity, and sought to enroll a "critical mass" of members of underrepresented minorities. 110 In her majority opinion
upholding the policy, Justice O'Connor she cited the following
additional factors in support of the policy:
The policX did not define diversity solely in terms of race and
ethnicity. 11
The "critical mass" concept used by the law school was not a
fixed quota whereby the school set aside "seats" for minority
students only. 112
A "race-blind" admissions program would have had a very
dramatic impact on underrepresented minority admissions. 113
Countless educational institutions since 1978 had modeled
their admissions policies on Justice Powell's opinion in

BakkeY 4

Justice O'Connor emphasized that "not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable. " 115 She deferred to the
law school's judgment that diversity is essential to its educational
mission and commented that the context of universities is a spe-

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

!d. at 315.
!d. at 334.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
!d. at 338.
!d. at 335.
!d. at 319.
!d. at 322-23.
!d. at 327.
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cial one in our constitutional tradition. 116 Courts should assume
good faith by higher education officials, absent a showing to the
contrary. 117 She also touted the demonstrable benefits of diversity-citing in particular briefs filed by American businesses and
the United States military. 118 In a passage quoted in countless
reports of the opinion, Justice O'Connor also noted that "effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in
the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized. " 119
In characteristic fashion, Justice O'Connor then sought to
contain the impact of the opinion by citing its many limitations.
Specifically, the use of race or ethnicity must be "narrowly tailored."120 Universities cannot adopt a quota system; rather, race
or ethnicity must be only one part of an individualized, flexible
consideration of each applicant that assesses all of the ways in
which an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.121 The process cannot insulate applicants who belong
to certain racial or ethnic groups from competition with other
applicants and must give substantial weight to qualities apart
from race. 122
She then countered this list of limitations with still more caveats. A university need not exhaust every conceivable raceneutral measure before adopting a race-conscious policy, 123 and
it need not choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all groups. 124 She wrapped up with a prediction that may become the most cited dictum from the Court
in many years: she forecast that affirmative action will one day
be unnecessary, and expressed hope that in twenty-five years, it
will have completed its role in educational reform. 125
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer wrote concurring opinions in
which they cautioned that while one can hope, one cannot not
firmly forecast, when it will be safe to "sunset" affirmative ac-

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

/d. at 329.
/d. at 348.
/d. at 330-31.
/d. at 332.
/d. at 333.
/d. at 334.
/d.
/d. at 339.
/d.
/d. at 343.
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tion. 126 They emphasized the differences between measures designed to burden racial minorities and those designed to boost
opportunities. 127 Given the American history of race discrimination and its lingering effects, the contrasting measures often may
not deserve the same constitutional fate.
As expected, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas found entirely unpersuasive the majority's
razor thin distinctions between the undergraduate and law
school policies. 128 They viewed the concept of seating a "critical
mass" of minority students as a mere smokescreen for quotas, 129
under which race operated as an automatic admissions factor in
most instances.
Justice Thomas' most powerful objection to the affirmative
action policy was that the policies do far more harm than good
for the intended beneficiaries. He invoked passages from a Frederick Douglass speech to abolitionists, in which Douglass insisted on justice for African Americans, but nothing more, adding that greater "interference is doing ... positive injury." 130
Justice Thomas bitterly denounced the law school's affirmative
action policy as a form of "racial aesthetics" that seduces under
prepared minority law applicants to matriculate at an elite institution, where they continue to receive affirmative action benefits, are then hired by employers with similar "aesthetic" goals,
and finally are expelled from elite sectors when the system is
through with them. 131 Eventually, Justice Thomas implied, minority graduates disappear from elite professional ranks because
they are unable to perform adequately in these settings without
the false buoying of affirmative action. 132 He castigated the majority for upholding the law school policy "not by interpreting
the people's Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan
of the cognoscenti." 133
Justice Scalia too sharply condemned the majority. He argued that it disregarded the prevailing standard for strict scrutiny, and hewed to political influences, rather than to constitutional dictates. 134 He objected to the majority's deference to
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

131.
132.
133.

134.

!d. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
!d. at 345.
!d. at 379 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting).
!d. at 385.
!d. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
!d. at 372.
!d.
!d. at 350.
!d. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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university judgments about the educational values of diversity
and scoffed that the law school's "mystical 'critical mass' justification for its discrimination by race challenge[ d] even the most
gullible mind. " 135 He continued: "the allegedly 'compelling state
interest' at issue here is not the incremental 'educational benefit'
that emanates from the fabled 'critical mass' of minority students, but rather Michigan's interest in maintaining a 'prestige'
law school whose normal admissions standards disproportionately exclude blacks and other minorities. If that is a compelling
state interest, everything is. " 136 He also noted acidly that if diversity were such an important vehicle for promoting tolerance, it
would be equally important in the civil service system of the
State of Michigan, as well as in private employment settings, so
that such employers should "not be criticized -indeed, should be
praised-if they also 'teach' good citizenship to their adult employees through a patriotic, all-American system of racial discrimination in hiring. " 137 He concluded: "the nonminority individuals who are deprived of a legal education, a civil service job,
or any
at all by reason of their skin color will surely understand." 38
In Gratz v. Bollinger139 the tide turned against the University of Michigan. The undergraduate admissions policy awarded
twenty of the one hundred points needed for admission to the
undergraduate program to any applicant from an "underrepresented minority group" 140 Unlike the law school admissions program, the undergraduate admissions program involved no individualized, "holistic" consideration of each application. 141
Moreover, the twenty points it awarded to under represented
minority group members had the practical effect of making race
a decisive factor in the admission of any otherwise qualified minority applicant. 142 As such, six justices concluded that the policy
was not narrowly tailored within the meaning of Grutter.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the
university's argument that the administrative burden of reviewing each applicant's file justified a set "points" approach. 143 Ad-

Job

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

/d. at 346-47.
Id. at 347.
/d. at 348.
/d.
539 U.S. at 244.
/d. at 277.
/d. at 274.
/d. at 272.
/d. at 275.
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ministrative convenience and expense, the Chief Justice countered, were not adequate reasons to uphold a constitutionally
suspect policy. 144
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence in which
she identified the flawed parts of the Michigan policy and suggested that Michigan could modify its admissions system to rescue its mission of seating a diverse class. 145 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment of the Court and joined in Justice
O'Connor's opinion except insofar as it endorsed the majority's
rationale. 146 Contrasting "benign" discrimination with invidious
discrimination, he argued that the former can survive strict scrutiny in some situations where the latter cannot. 147 Justice Breyer
nevertheless voted to strike down the undergraduate policy, presumably because he believed it went too far to advance these
benign goals.
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter dissented. 148 In their
view, the undergraduate program's "points" method of acknowledging race was no more objectionably race-conscious than the
law school's holistic "critical mass" policy was. 149 Moreover, it
was commendably transparent and properly tailored to ensure
diversity in the undergraduate population. 150
Taken together, the two cases endorsed diversity as a worthy goal, but in very significant contextual and temporal brackets. The Court treated student body diversity as a means of enriching the classroom environment for all students, not only
those who receive the admissions preferences. Yet it demanded
a thicker version of diversity than any simple racial or ethnic
goal implies.
All eyes now will turn to the particulars of admissions programs across the country. Defenders of these policies will be expected to explain how they work, to what extent they are individualized and "holistic," and whether (and how) they place
weight on race and ethnicity. Race-conscious recruitment and
admissions policies must be justified and individualized, which
will be an expensive proposition for large public universities that
receive thousands of applications each year. The Michigan cases
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 279 (O'Connor, 1., concurring).
(Breyer, J., concurring).
at 283.
at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
(Souter, J., dissenting).
at 296.
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do not oblige public universities to take race and ethnicity into
account; they merely allow schools to do so, within limits. Consequently, states still may pass laws, and citizens may continue to
propose referendums, that prohibit use of race in university admissions/51 and universities can voluntarily abandon raceconscious measures.
The many caveats built into both cases and the thin factual
distinctions between them make them difficult to synthesize. In
Grutter, Justice Scalia predicted a flurrts of fact-specific lawsuits
in the aftermath of Grutter and Gratz, 52 because their contextsensitive results, he argued, are open invitations to free-form
litigation over other schools' admissions policies, over raceconscious scholarship programs, and over race-conscious policies
in many other domains. 153 "I do not look forward to any of these
cases," he grimly predicted. 154
Justice Scalia's dread is somewhat difficult to understand,
however, given standard Supreme Court fare. Whether a holiday
display violates the Establishment Clause/ 55 whether a government subsidy scheme imposes an undue burden on free speech
or religion, 156 whether substantive due process is violated by laws
that burden reproductive freedom/ 57 whether government regulation of land use "goes too far" and constitutes a "taking," 158 or
whether a federal civil rights statute is "proportional" to the
harms it seeks to remedy 159 - to take but a few thorny examples can hinge on similarly narrow factual and doctrinal distinctions.
The affirmative action cases are hardly unique in this respect.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia is clearly correct, that many issues related to affirmative action remain unresolved. For exam151. In Michigan, a "Michigan Civil Rights Initiative" has been drafted to amend the
state Constitution to prohibit the universities, the state, and all other state entities "from
discriminating or granting preferential treatment based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin." Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, http:www.mcri2004.org/. It remains to
be seen whether this proposed amendment will secure the necessary signatures to be
adopted. Of course, California (Prop. 209) and Washington (Initiative 200) already have
state measures that prohibit race-conscious admissions policies.
152. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. /d. at 347-48.
154. /d. at 349.
155. County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
156. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 521 U.S. 533 (2001); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991); Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 738 (2002).
157. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Webster v. Reprod. Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
158. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
159. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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pie, current federal government policy permits the use of race as
one factor in student financial aid, under narrow conditions
based primarily on a remedy theory. 160 Whether race-conscious
scholarships created for diversity purposes are constitutional is
an issue that almost certainly with inspire litigation.
Another, looming question is whether educational outreach
programs can be targeted solely toward racial and ethnic minorities. For example, if an engineering school tends to under enroll
or retain minority student::;, may it offer a pre-enrollment or
post-enrollment academic support program for minority students
only? The recent cases cast doubt on the "minority only" aspect
of such a program, but also suggest that such a program might be
a sensible, time-limited measure that advances diversity without
displacing innocent third parties from enrolling in the engineering school.
Finally, the cases do not settle whether achieving "diversity"
now is a compelling reason for race-conscious measures in other
contexts, especially employment. Justice Scalia is quite right to
expect these litigation scenarios, if not dread them. No one
should expect, however, that strict scrutiny is now a flaccid test,
any more than one should expect, after Lawrence, that the rational basis test has grown large teeth.
Ill. THE SKY IS NOT FALLING- THE HEAVENS
ARE NOT OPENING
The current Court has not abandoned its traditional "hands
off" approach to review of most government action, as much as
some people fear-or as others may hope. Racing Association
and Buckeye prove there still is a rational basis "there there,"
under which successful challenges of governmental action remain very rare. When the Court is more interventionist, it is responding to multiple, powerful forces that may include changes
in social practices and attitudes, community and judicial experience with traditional rules and their impact on citizens, empathic
shifts, and a host of other factors that inform judicial and popu-

160. See Department of Education: Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil rights Act of 1964 59 Fed. Reg. 87,56, 87,61 (Feb. 23, 1994)
(the regulatiOns also allow schools to consider race or national origin, among other factors, as a conditiOn of ehg1biiity for a1d to promote diversity, but only if the measures are
"narrowly tailored"); see also Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (en
bane).

570

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:547

lar distinctions between merely foolish and absurdly irrational
policies.
These shifts in judicial thinking begin slowly and episodically. When new claims for intervention first emerge, they usually are denied-occasionally over an impassioned dissent and
public ripples of consternation. When the new claims begin to
prevail, they often involve attacks on the most coercive forms of
government power-such as criminal punishment. These early
successes appear aberrational- doctrinal footnotes, or "cf." material. Slowly, however, the rulings may be extended to less coercive forms of government action, until a generally accepted presumption emerges that the classification (e.g. homosexuality,
gender, race) is an "irrational" basis for any government action.
Lawrence, Grutter, and aspects of Gratz reflect such doctrinal evolution. Lawrence involved parties-gay men-who
barely elided the Court's traditional indicia of a "suspect classification. " 161 Classifications based upon sexual orientation do, in
some ways, operate as "suspect" classifications do: they look
past a person's actual character and seize upon a perceived
status as a proxy for characteristics that might otherwise justify
legislative burdens. These classifications also are often used to
deny or burden basic opportunities -like employment or sexual
autonomy-that do not fall within accepted categories of "fundamental rights," 162 but that share some of the characteristics of
fundamental rights because they are central to one's ability to
fully participate in public arenas, or to enjoy customary levels of
liberty in private arenas. When a sexual orientation classification
impinges directly upon the right to engage in sexual intimacy, as
it did in Lawrence, it strikes a zone that the state rarely enters
without a compelling reason, let alone to criminalize conduct by
consenting adults. Of course, the state does intrude into this
realm on occasion, and the notion that it cannot do so as a matter of constitutional law has never sat easily with all of the Justices. But the latter proposition itself is controversial, especially
to strong libertarians who would first require substantial evidence of tangible harm to others before allowing government to
intrude. In sum, the facts of Lawrence closely resembled, yet departed from, classic strict scrutiny cases.

161.

Laurence Tribe has called this the "covert" use of a higher standard of scrutiny.

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1445 (2d ed. 1988).

162. The doctrinal concept of "fundamental rights" in this arena evolved from Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,450 (1938).
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The admissions policy in Grutter likewise elided existing
formal categories. The policy deployed race as a criterion but did
so to assist, not burden, racial minorities. The intent and the
generally accepted meaning of the racial classification in Grutter
thus were distinguishable from the racial classifications deployed
before Brown v. Board of Education. 163 Although the Court in
recent years has insisted that all racial classifications trigger strict
scrutiny, even if motivated by benign instincts, 164 this has been
analytically, politically, and practically fraught. Consequently, a
majority of the Court has consistently maintained that strict
scrutiny can be satisfied, even in cases that involve race. That is,
some of the Justices -like many citizens-do not believe that all
race classifications are equally "irrational," given our cultural
backdrop of de jure and de factoracism.
The policy in Gratz matched most of the features of the policy in Gruffer, but with one crucial difference: the Gratz policy
overtly used a "rigid" number of "points" in a way that Bakke
condemned. 165 This slight-critics might say functionally immaterial- in the structure of the racial preference was enough to tip
the policy into an existing judicial category and trigger its demise.
Both of the University of Michigan cases were distinguishable from Racing Association because they involved a traditional
suspect classification- race. Consequently, both admissions policies ostensibly received "strict" judicial scrutiny, not mere rational basis review. Significantly, however, only one of the policies was overturned, despite this closer review.
Lawrence too was distinguishable from Racing Association,
even though it arguably relied upon "rational basis" in overturning the Texas sodomy law. Again, Lawrence entailed two important interests-protection of adults' privacy in their own
homes 166 and rejection of "mere animus" as a basis for legislative
distinctions. 167 Lawrence's significant doctrinal contribution consisted of enabling a majority of the Court to extend this privacy
zone to embrace all consenting adults, without regard to sex of
163. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(upholding racial classification as warranted by national security).
164. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
165. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
166. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia 2394 U.S. 557 (1969) .
. ~67. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
L1vmg Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973).
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the partner. The state could not cast its gaze on heterosexual relationships before Lawrence; now it also cannot cast its gaze on
homosexual relationships. The constitutional norm at stake remains essentially the same: government should not intrude into
this most private of adult realms, absent a convincing reason,
such as the prevention of significant concrete harm to others.
Lawrence thus did not shift established principles or renounce
traditional majoritarian power, as Justice Scalia warned. Rather,
Lawrence applied established principles to new choices by the
same adult or-viewed another way-to other adults long
thought to be beyond majoritarian dictates. Lawrence also represented, of course, a shift in judicial thinking about the harms of
homosexuality to the wider community and thus of the rationality of official decisions to condemn, criminalize, or otherwise
punish it.
Indeed, the Court showed remarkable judicial restraint during the 2002 Term. It upheld the Iowa tax law differential. It upheld an apparently race-skewed referendum in Buckeye. It allowed one race-conscious admissions policy to stand despite
strict scrutiny and struck down another on very narrow factual
grounds while offering suggestions about how the policy might
be redrafted. In its sole display of activism, Lawrence, the Court
relied upon precedent and took great pains to narrow its holding
to the regulation of adult consensual sexual practices within the
most intimate of spaces, the home.
Although critics complain that cases like Lawrence hike traditional rational basis review onto stilts and that cases like Grutter transform traditional strict scrutiny into a meager version of
itself, the cases actually do neither. Though tested on the margins, the traditional formulations remain intact.
Such marginal stress is inevitable and healthy. There always
have been and always will be cases that defy judicially crafted
boundaries and that resist easy analogy to familiar fact patterns.
These cases require the Court to reconsider the traditional
boundaries and to take a deeper look at the principles that first
inspired those boundaries. 168 The methodology is inherently nonformulaic because the cases lie on the margins of formulas.
168. The interplay within constitutional doctrine between fixed categories and intercategory "float" is perpetual. Deductive logic is of limited use in these cases, given the
opacity of the text, history, traditions, and the policy factors that inform these decisions.
This is so despite the many good works detailing the perils of "balancing tests." See, e.g.,
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitwional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943
(1987).
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These cases require the Court to look beyond doctrine in assessing whether to extend doctrine to new terrain. The majority's
consideration of the social real world developments in Lawrence
and in the affirmative action cases, 169 and its recognition that cultural changes may influence constitutional outcomes, thus were
entirely sensible means of resolving difficult cases.
Of course, there are other ways. The Court could refuse to
ever apply equal protection or substantive due process protection beyond the categories already established in settled case
law. This certainly would offer greater doctrinal clarity and quiet
critics of the Court's alleged activism. A "no growth" approach
is absurd, however, if one considers how much terrain modern
government covers, how few "suspect classifications" and fundamental rights already have been identified, and how many
ways government can test the limits of substantive "reason." Allowing for doctrinal migration -despite its difficulties-is vastly
preferable to doctrinal stagnation. It is also a very familiar process in American law. As Justice Souter has said, "it is here that
the value of common law method becomes apparent, for the
usual thinking of the common law is suspicious of the ali-ornothing analysis that tends to produce legal petrification. " 170
To reject "legal petrification" does not mean a wholehearted embrace of open-ended formulations of rationality. Our
Court is unlikely to ever adopt a fluid, "We know it when we see
it" standard of rational basis review. Such an open-ended approach would be rejected by most -if not all -of the sitting Justices. Indeed, Justice Scalia has made very clear that he believes
any "common law" approach to constitutional interpretationeven the quite moderate one the Court actually follows-is an
unprincipled overturning of democratic will, 171 a charge that all
should find worrisome.
Yet despite Justice Scalia's thoughtful and persistent objections to the Court's present approach, and a more generally
shared resistance to judicial activism, the Court continues to review and occasionally overturns government acts under equal
protection and substantive due process even in the absence of
169. See Grwter, 539 U.S. at 306 (recognizing the expertise of a university in making
"complex educational judgments").
170. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,770 (1997) (Souter, 1., concurring).
171. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 37-41 (1997); see also Antonio Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1186-87 (1989) (acknowledging that balancing modes of analysis
are mevllable, but should be avoided where possible).
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plain text, uninterrupted historical practices, or other reasonably
steadfast anchors of interpretation. Lawrence can be read as a
substantive due process case that fell outside of all established
categories of fundamental rights or suspect classes, yet overturned government policy. Earlier cases such as Romer v. Evans172 also relied on the traditional rational basis test of equal
protection, yet overturned government action. Can this practice
of doctrinal modification without resort to text, history, or even
the judicially established categories of elevated scrutiny be justified?
The answer, I believe, is yes. Dynamic play in the doctrinal
joints is justified by past judicial practice, by the imperfect nature of government, by the shortcomings of existing categories,
and by the Court's special role. I will highlight here only the
most powerful features of each argument, as they apply to cases
from 2002. 173
1. Past Judicial Practice

Constitutional doctrine is and has always been a human
creation, not a divine emanation arising from the text or framers'
intent. Equal protection and substantive due process doctrine
are no exception. The cases depend upon human judgment as informed by human experience, both of which are malleable in
ways that defy formalism. For example, the cases that first identified "suspect classes" or "fundamental rights" entailed a dynamic and fluid approach to rights, under which the Court accommodated changed perspectives on government power, on
affected private interests, and on the delicate balance between
them. The Court attached these analytically significant labels
only after it considered a complex set of factors, including sociopolitical phenomena external to text and doctrine.
The so-called "selective incorporation" of rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment likewise occurred over time and entailed judgment calls not dictated by text. The Court deemed
freedom of speech to be incorporated into fourteenth amendment due process in 1925, 174 though the fourteenth amendment
nowhere mentions freedom of speech. "Due process" is hardly
an obvious or uncontroversial signal that the framers of the four172.
173.
ries can
174.

517 U.S. at 620.
A fuller account of my views about dynamism at the margins of judicial categobe found in Massaro, supra note 50.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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teenth amendment intended to incorporate any specific part of
the Bill of Rights, including freedom of speech. Moreover, even
after the Court deemed freedom of speech to be fundamental to
ordered liberty and thus part of substantive due process, it used
"reasonableness" as the test of state-imposed burdens on expression.175 "Strict scrutiny" of state action in this arena is a quite recent judicial invention. 176 In any event, whether the Court analyzes freedom of expression under a flaccid "rational basis" test,
the most demanding version of "strict scrutiny" test, or "intermediate" scrutiny, the Court weighs multiple factors that might
plausibly be better weighed by legislators or other nonjudicial
actors. The burden on speech, potential harms or "secondary effects" of speech, the comparative value of speech, and whether
reasonable alternative methods of expression exist- none of
these factors is susceptible to wholly objective measurements,
and all entail policy determinations. Yet few people, including
Justice Scalia, would claim that the Court usurps democratic will
when it makes first amendment decisions.
First amendment law may be iconic, but it is not unique. In
countless other areas of constitutional law the Court engages in a
common law-like process of doctrinal development. In each
area, the Court accommodates changes on the margins of accepted law because the Court finds it impossible-as well it
should-to uphold government acts that defy constitutional
"reason," as this notion has been and is informed by logical extensions of the underlying constitutional principles, by analogy
to the accepted elevated scrutiny cases, by the Justices' practical
experiences, and by evolving cultural norms of "reason. "
Here again, Lawrence is an excellent if controversial example of dynamic constitutional interpretation. The majority could
not stand idle in the face of legislation that struck it as intolerable, given precedent regarding the scope of sexual autonomy,
changed attitudes about the alleged social harms of homosexuality, and a growing sense that criminalizing this behavior was illiberal, even cruel. Missing from the opinion, of course, were key
phrases-especially "fundamental right"- that the Court in recent decades has linked to outcomes that struck down government acts otherwise well within its regulatory powers. But the
basic task was a familiar one. The Court reviewed government
action in light of precedent, and responded to what some citizens
175.
176.

!d. at 670.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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view as an arbitrary imposition and purposeless restraint. 177 It
spoke of liberty, privacy, and human dignity, and it chose to act
to protect them, despite the political firestorm it surely knew
would follow.
If Lawrence is condemned over time as poorly crafted or
analytically shaky, but correctly decided as a matter of policy
and justice, it will be in superb constitutional company, as Brown
v. Board of Education proves. Breakthrough decisions typically
are analytically imperfect because they rearrange relationships
between and among the existing categories, and because the
categories themselves are analytically imperfect.
In any event, analytical purity is hardly the sole judicial goal
here. Moreover, it is virtually unattainable in the highly abstract
realm of constitutional law. Unless constitutional doctrine today
has achieved perfection-a ludicrous notion for any generation
of judges to embrace-then occasional analytical fissures may
signal healthy growth, not doctrinal chaos or dissolution. Recognizing this, a majority of the Court has never favored the death
of doctrinal development- even in the highly contested arena of
substantive due process-and has continued to apply doctrine to
new terrain. The modern Court therefore is preserving tradition
rather than disrupting it.
2. Imperfect Government and the Shortcomings of Existing
Categories

Another reason to support evolutionary dynamism within
equal protection and substantive due process doctrine is that
government action can confound "reason" in remarkably extensive ways that cannot be fully captured by any one set of principles or by current categories. 178 Indeed, a single act might be irrational in multiple ways, though people may disagree about
which types of reason it violates and why. Consequently, for the
Court to draft an eternal set of doctrinal principles and a finite
set of factors for all potential applications of these principles,
would be astoundingly complex. The "common law" method

177. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (1994) (noting that flexibility in
rules is necessary because lawmakers cannot anticipate all consequences or contexts in
advance); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (The Supreme Court 2002 Term concluding that
"constitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture").
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that Justice Scalia rejects thus is actually well-suited to the task
of deciding these "rational basis" cases.
A simple series of examples shows just how complex assessments of rationality can become. Assume, for example, that
the Congress or a state legislature adopts measure A, to promote
end E. How might this act be irrational (though not necessarily
unconstitutional)? A non-exhaustive list of logical flaws might
include the following:
1. A does not actually serve E.

2. Government officials did not reasonably believe A served
E when they enacted the measure, but it does in fact further that end. E is a good end.
3. A does serve E, but E is not a good end.
4.

A serves E, a good end, but is trumped by weightier good
end F, which is substantially thwarted by A.

5.

A serves E, a good end, but also promotes F, a bad end
(corollary of 4).

6.

A does serve good end E, but far less well than other

means that serve E better.
7.

A does serve good end E, but government officials actually sought to promote E only in order to promote good
end F, and A does not promote F.

8. Government adopted A in order to serve E, a bad end,
which A does serve, but it turns out to also serve end F, a
good end.
9. Government adopted A in order to serve E, a good end,
but it did so knowing it would have a much harsher impact
on a minority of citizens than others, but did it anyway.
10. Government adopted A in order to serve E, but defined
the class of individuals regulated by A in a manner that
exempts some citizens but not others, with no "rational"
basis for doing so.
11. Same as 10, but government acted out of "animus" toward
the burdened class of citizens, where burden on them is
disproportionate to any harm to others that the regulation
seeks to prevent.
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12. Government followed a non-democratic process to determine whether to do E, though E is a good end, and the
process does serve E.

This series is obviously and intentionally incomplete-for
example, it does not address the many process flaws that might
render government action "irrational" under either equal protection or substantive due process. 179 Nor does this list describe
how to evaluate government rationality in the many cases where
reliable evidence relevant to the regulatory inquiry is unavailable or inconclusive.
Again, the five cases from the 2002 Term are exceptionally
instructive. They show how difficult it would be for the Court to
frame one test for "irrationality" that would capture all of the
nuances raised by even a quite small number of cases.
Where did each case from last term fall, within the above
typography of "irrational" acts?
The Texas statute in Lawrence arguably fell under 1, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
The Michigan admissions policies in Grutter and Gratz arguably fell under 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
The differential tax scheme in Racing Association, however,
arguably fell under 6 and 10, and the referendum process in
Buckeye arguably fell under 4, 5, and 11.
One might infer that the greater the number of possible "irrationalities," the more likely it is that the Court will overturn a
measure. In some cases, this assumption likely would hold-a
government act that suffers from so many flaws may be harder
to stomach. But this is not necessarily so: Grutter upheld the law
school's policy, whereas Gratz struck the University's policy
down, though both arguably were susceptible to the same, high
number of characterizations as "irrational." (This is why the split
results were so troublesome to many Court observers and policymakers.) Racing Association, in contrast, fit very few of the
"irrationality" scenarios, yet would have come out differently if
only one factor changed: if the citizens treated less well under
179. In general, the Court has decided that a legislative act that serves a good end
should be upheld, even if it was adopted for bad reasons. But this is not always, or even
so literally, so. "Purpose" matters to constitutional analysis in many ways, and a very bad
purpose may well influence a court's estimation of the gravity of the harms it produces.
See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle of
constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute
on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motivation.")
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the measure had been defined by race, gender, or state citizenship- "type 10" irrationality."
Buckeye was an alleged "political process" defect with a
"state action" kicker. The outcome turned on i.he Court's reluctance to ascribe alleged racial animus of voters to the City officials, where the officials' actions were apparently nondiscretionary, were procedurally regular, and did not otherwise add an
official boost to private animus. One can argue, of course, that
the City's failure to modify its process to avoid giving private
bias an official outlet was "irrational," in the same way that discriminatory action by the City itself would have been irrational
(Type 9). The Court over time has decided to treat these bias
scenarios differently, both as a function of the state action doctrine, and through its Washington v. Davis 180 line of cases, which
requires a showing of government's intent to discriminate
against a protected class. But these limits on the meaning of discrimination were not inevitable: they were judicial constructions
of equality.
In sum, regardless of doctrinal garb, all substantive due
process and equal protection cases entail balancing. The Court in
every decision must distinguish garden-variety government "irrationality" (and uphold it), from government "irrationality" on
stilts (and strike it down).Whatever categories the Court develops to capture the process will defy easy summary given the variety of government acts that are subject to judicial review. The
Court's "three tier" approach crudely separates cases into "close
review"- "some review"- "little or no review" categories, but
its actual and ongoing process of funneling cases into these categories is analytically imperfect, and a matter of balance, pragmatism, and judicial judgment. If this is judicial "activism," then activism is inescapable.
3. The Special Role of the Court

Of course, to say that government may act irrationally, in
multiple ways, or to point out recent examples of such acts, still
does not prove that the Court should be given broad discretion
to correct for these abuses as it sees fit. Instead, the wide variety
of potential government errors may lead one to conclude that
judicial flexibility should be curtailed, not expanded.
180. 426 U.S. 239 (1976). See also Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977); see generally David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935 (1989).
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Justice Scalia, for one, surely would point to the foregoing
list of potential government follies as an excellent argument
against overturning government action, absent very explicit textual or historical indications that the action is improper. Thought
he might concede that these decisions entail complex judgment
calls, he would argue that they nevertheless should be made
through the political process as far as possible. As imperfect and
illogical as the political process might be, it surely beats the judicial process every time-not because the government, acting
through the people, acts rationally in any self-proving sense, but
because "rationality" is never self-proving and may not even be
the point of legislation. Consequently, all of these policy decisions should be left to the wider democratic process, and certainly should not be made by a "law trained elite. " 181 That is, the
Court should talk the formalist talk and walk the formalist
walk-all the way to doctrine's edge.
Once again, however, I disagree about Justice Scalia's assumptions about the current application of the worthy general
principle of judicial restraint. To be sure, intervention by unelected federal judges is not a proper vehicle for bottom up policy formulation. But, the Court intervenes only after government
officials have acted, and their actions have been challenged by
citizens as cruel, captured, clueless, or corrupt. This intervention
is not necessarily a disruption of "democracy," and may even be
described as a vehicle for perfecting it. A much worse alternative, as I see it, would be for judges to so align themselves with
government officials that they refused to ever act on their power
of review, even in cases brought by citizens who insist they have
been seriously mistreated. 182 Such robust, horizontal, and vertical
181.

See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Cf John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2395 (2003) (noting that " a statute's apparently odd contours may reflect unknowable compromises or
legislators' behind-the-scenes strategic maneuvers" so that "a legislative classification can
seem absurd (in a policy sense) but still be rational (in a process sense) as a means of assuring the passage of the overall legislation")). That is, close examination of how laws
actually are made undermine notions of "rational legislation" in ways that may point
against judicial interventions. Of course, the "irrationality" of the process may prompt
others to argue that judicial interventions are necessary.
182. Many commentators, of course, have already made similar observations, with
varying degrees of force and sophistication. Among the most famous of these is the late
John Hart Ely's account of judicial review, which too anticipates a modest corrective role
for the judiciary to play in assuring that the democratic process remains participationoriented and representation-reinforcing. Countless others have critiqued or expanded
upon Ely's theory, and many have focused on the complexities of defining a process defect, or of identifying the type of "democracy" one hopes to protect through constitutional law. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
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deference to government processes and officials-who range
from members of Congress, to state legislators, state attorneys
general, to university faculty committees, police officers, public
librarians, park officials, municipal planning boards, border patrol agents, to city council members, to prison guards, to parole
officers, to child protective services investigators-would be contrary to our experience, our history, and our common sense.
Moreover, there is no cross-contextual reason to assume
that all or even most government action-whether at the state,
local, or federal level-necessarily reflects any true "majority's"
will. In many contexts, the opposite assumption is warranted. 183
In what sense, then, are the foregoing government officials part
of a "democratic" process? Many likely are not, and thus do not
see themselves as such, or as constrained by democratic principles when they execute their duties.
There also is no reason to condemn a decision simply because it emerges from a body composed of legally trained people. Many government bodies besides the Supreme Court likewise are composed of "law trained elites," and the Supreme
Court and the lower courts are hardly immune from cultural or
political influences that affect government decisionmakers in
other realms. Judges in several states are elected, 184 and the
process of appointing federal and state court judges is far from
apolitical. Few if any judges operate unaware of or heedless of
politics, despite respect for the limiting principles of judicial independence, textual constraint, and stare decisis, among other
powerful curbs on judicial excess.
There likewise is no reason to assume that the absence of
"legal elites" in constitutional decisionmaking, in particular,
would promote better substantive outcomes. Legally trained
REVIEW (1980). See a/so ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (describing the "countermajoritarian" difficulty); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT 78 (2001) (arguing that judicial review is not inconsistent with selfgovernance); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT 168, 172 (2002) (arguing that "constitutionalism is not counter to
democracy," that constitutionalism "is required by democracy" and a written Constitution demands judicial review); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAy
FROM THE COURTS 129-53 (1999) (questioning the courts' capabilities); JEREMY
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 296-98 (1999) (arguing that the judiciary supplants popular values).
183. See EISGRUBER, supra note 182, at 78.
184. See Daniel Isaacs & Sandra Newman, Historical Overview of the Judicial Selection Process in the United States: Is the Electoral System in Pennsylvania Unjustified?, 49
VILL. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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people have profession-specific experiences that may be directly
relevant to constitutional law. For one thing, they have received
an education that typically includes instruction in constitutional
decisionmaking over time, discussion of alternative methods of
constitutional interpretation, and the cautionary tales of Lochner
v. New York, Korematsu v. United States, Dred Scott v. Sandford,
and Plessy v. Ferguson. For another, judges and lawyers get a
close look at the actual impact of government policy on the governed. Granting judges authority to mitigate the harshest, cruelest, or most unintended consequences of these laws -especially
when the consequences are felt only by a small minority of citizens-seems a sensible, reasonably efficient, even democracyenhancing corrective to a sometimes wooden and unfeeling legislative process. Recall that this nullification power is exercised infrequently, is subject to further review, proceeds on the basis of
analogies to past decisions, and is conducted in public. 185 This
modest check on public officials is especially important as applied to policies that are adopted by the countless low-visibility
decisionmakers whose actions otherwise would never pass
through a public, deliberative body.
Once again, the 2002 term speaks volumes. In Lawrence, the
Court addressed the culturally riveting issue of gay rights-or, as
Justice Scalia put it, "the homosexual agenda." 186 In his view, legal "elites" may have effected a "massive disruption of the current social order." Here, as in Romer, Justice Scalia condemned
the Court for taking a stand in the culture wars. 187 Yet this particular culture war -if it deserves this name-erupted due to social activism, the AIDS crisis, modern films and theater, television, talk shows, religious and political responses to activism, and
other nonlegal contributors to cultural foment over the issues,
not from a court decision.
The Court in Lawrence did step into a cultural fray, to be
sure. But no matter how the Court resolved Lawrence, it would
have been engaged in that fray, and properly so: this cultural war
has become an intense battle over the reach of our Constitution
and over the proper balance between individual rights and majoritarian morality. If the Court refused to enter this battle on
the ground that it is not its place, then it ought to beat a hasty re-

185.
cur, see
186.
187.

For a particularly compelling development of this argument, with which I consupra note 182.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
Romer, 518 U.S. at 652 (Scalia,J., dissenting).

EISGRUBER,
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treat in many other realms where it traditionally has played a
prominent role. 188
In any event, legally trained elites actually may be quite well
situated to examine the rationality of theories that are commonly advanced in support of criminalization of sexual relations
between same sex partners. As Justice Scalia notes -though with
sarcasm-sanctions against homosexual, bisexual, and transgendered people have been lifted in law schools as a matter of
AALS policy. 189 Consequently, law students may be more open
about their sexuality. Law graduates thus may have impressions
of homosexuality that depart from dire predictions about what
would happen if taboos against same-sex relations were lifted.
Their attitudes may not be the product of "political correctness"
or any "group think" foisted upon students by liberal law professors; rather, they may be based on their direct experiences with
their openly gay or lesbian colleagues. 190 These experiences may
affect their evaluation of the professional and personal consequences of criminalizing sexual relations between same-sex
partners. That is, "judicial notice" of how the world works-not
professional proselytizing or elitism-may have change some
judges' views about sodomy laws. 191
I am not arguing-it would be absurd to do so-that legal
professionals are inherently better than nonprofessionals at
making policy decisions for the country. Rather, I am arguing
that they may play an important role in constitutional assessments of the reasons underlying policy decisions that burden individual liberties, in part because of the training they receive and
188. Cf Post, supra note 178, at 81 (noting that courts simply cannot apply constitutional doctrine without drawing upon their understandings of cultural practices).
189. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that AALS
rules require member schools to ban from job interview facilities a Jaw firm that does not
wish to hire openly gay or lesbian lawyers); Bylaws of the Association of American Law
Schools, Inc., § 6-4 (prohibiting discrimination based upon sexual orientation).
190. In similar ways, the American businesses, the United States military, and the
hundreds of educational institutions that weighed in on the value of "diversity" in last
term's affirmative action cases may not have been speaking on the basis of any "elitist"
privilege or out of "political correctness," but on the basis of their own direct, democratizing experiences with students, workers, and soldiers from diverse backgrounds. If anything, the diversity principles and practices they endorsed would displace privilege and
undercut elitism; it is quite difficult to view affirmative action that benefits racial minorities as a "capture" problem that reserves benefits solely for the already most prosperous,
social, and political "elites."
191. Cf Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 330 (D.C. 1995) (discussing why
a legislallve heanng may not be better suited than a court hearing when determining factual claims about the nature and causes of homosexuality, given the political ramificatiOns of appeanng to endorse homosexuality).
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their professional commitments. In any event, to argue that the
"elitism" inherent in professional training makes judicial decisions inherently antidemocratic strikes me as flat-out wrong. If it
were true, it would be difficult to justify judicial review in nearly
any form.
Similarly unpersuasive is Justice Scalia's occasional indictment of the Court for relying on "personal predilection" in resolving substantive due process and equal protection cases. 192 If
the Court leaves this scene of constitutional decisionmaking
solely on the basis that the Justices' personal predilections might
influence how they interpret facts and apply the principles, then
it should leave most of them, given the nature of the beast. Justices are not potted plants and inevitably must draw on experience when deciding tough cases. It is mystifying that Justice
Scalia in particular would complain that judges may act-in
part-on their "personal predilections," given his legal realist
statements about judges. For example, in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 193 he viewed as obvious and unproblematic
that any well-qualified judicial candidate will have "predilections," and concluded a candidate should be allowed to talk
about these views when running for an elected judicial post, even
though he or she also must act "impartially" if elected. 194 Justice
Scalia must believe, as I do, that bending to facts, as one perceives them through the lens of one's life experiences, is not the
same as bending facts. If so, he might consider the wider implications of this insight for constitutional doctrine, rhetoric, and interpretation.
Perhaps Justice Scalia would respond that the primary problem with a flexible, evolutionary approach to substantive due
process and equal protection doctrine is not that the Court lacks
special insights, but that flexibility destabilizes doctrine and
makes context matter too much. This kind of unpredictability
seems to be the crux of his gripe that Grutter and Gratz will
spawn new litigation. Again, however, the objection is unconvincing. Some unpredictability about future applications of constitutional principles announced by the Court comes with the
territory, as any observer of constitutional law well knows. The
text is vague, the principles are general, the doctrine is composed

192. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
194. !d. at 784.
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by multiple authors, not one univocal author, and the result can
be maddeningly obscure.
Consider the following criticisms of constitutional doctrine,
across many fields, and in general:
Unless the Court modifies or attempts to clarify its approach,
standing doctrine will likely remain a mystery to litigants and
lower courts. 195
The [political question] doctrine has always proven to be an
enigma to commentators. Not only have they disagreed about
its wisdom and validity ... but they also have differed signifi196
cantly over the doctrine's scope and rationale.
A persistently disturbing aspect of constitutional law is its lack
of theory, a lack which is manifest not merely in the work of
the courts but in the public, professional, and even scholarly
discussion of the topic. 197
The past, particularly the aspects that the interpretivists care
about, is in its essence indeterminate; the interpretivist project
198
cannot be carried to its conclusion.

The "rational basis" test is thus hardly the only constitutional doctrine vulnerable to the critique of "incoherence," "subjectivity," or "contextualism." Even within the category of strict
scrutiny, many doctrinal permutations have emerged that hinge
on context. "Government classifications sometimes require "important" government reasons, "compelling government reasons"
or "exceedingly persuasive" government reasons. In United
States v. Virginia, for example, the Court demanded "exceedingly persuasive" justifications for gender-based classificationsplacing these classifications in a grey zone above "intermediate"
and just below "strict" scrutiny terminology. 199
In the free speech area, where explicit text protects the right
in question, the Court has created a doctrinal morass. The gen195. TRIBE, supra note 161, at 111, § 3-15.
196. Martin Redish, Judicial Review and the Political Question, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1031 (1985). Indeed, one might simply read the title of Louis Henkin's well-known piece,
Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976), to see the level of confusion that the Supreme Court decisions in this area can generate.
197. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J.1 (1971).
198. Mark Y. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism
and Newral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781,800 (1983).
199. 518 U.S. 515,525 (1996).
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eral claim that content-based government regulations of speech
trigger "strict scrutiny" is subject to so many exceptions that the
statement is extremely misleading. In a recent case involving
congressional conditions on federal funds for public libraries,
Justice Breyer suggested that the Court use "heightened, but not
'strict scrutiny."' It supplements the latter with an approach that
is more flexible but nonetheless provides the legislature with less
than ordinary leeway in light of the fact that constitutionally protected expression is at issue.
Were Justice Breyer's suggestion one's first encounter with
constitutional law, one might leave the field in despair, especially
if one came to it expecting doctrinal lines to be stark, driven by
pages of history, and warranted by the "plain meaning" of the
text. After multiple exposures to constitutional law, however,
the passage seems unremarkable, even wise, given the multiple
forces a court must juggle in imposing first amendment limits on
government funding power. Why, then, would a Supreme Court
Justice, of all people, express shock and dismay over and over
again at judicial interpretive practices that demand balancing of
interests, or which change with the times or in context? The
practice is well ingrained, inescapable, and deeply embedded in
the very process of interpreting and apply imperfectly drafted
laws to fact patterns often not anticipated by the rule makers.
That said, the indeterminacy of constitutional law can easily
be overstated. Despite the murkiness, there are remarkably few
surprises. Once again, the decisions of the 2002 term are instructive. Although Justice Scalia lamented the open-ended implications of Grutter and Gratz, he seemed truly outraged about what
he saw as the inevitable effects of Lawrence. 200 Yet if predictability were a primary goal, and if Scalia reads Lawrence's future
impact correctly, then why is the case so worrisome? Moreover,
all of the cases last term actually were quite predictable -many
Court observers anticipated that O'Connor would be cast the
deciding vote in the affirmative action cases and might well "split
the difference." Nearly everyone expected the Court to overturn
the Texas statute, once it agreed to hear the case. And all could
have predicted the outcomes in Buckeye and Racing Association.
Unpredictability thus was not a major problem last year.
In any event, predictability alone hardly marks an unerring
path to sound constitutional decisions. A Justice could always
uphold racial classifications, or never uphold them. Likewise, a
200.

123 S. Ct. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice could always uphold sexual orientation classifications, or
never do so. As the race and sexual orientation cases demonstrate, however, the real world is simply not that easy, and neither is the constitutional doctrine that grapples with real-world
problems in an ever-changing environment.
Given the Court's actual interpretive practices, and given
the departures these practices occasionally produce, one might
argue that the Court should at least do a better job of matching
its words with its deeds. The Court should openly state that it
follows one dynamic, pragmatic, and context-driven approach to
substantive due process and e~ual protection, and jettison talk of
categories or tiers of review. 20 It should simply ask in each case
whether government has convincing reasons for acts that significantly burden liberty, property or life, and identify a nonexhaustive cluster of concerns for lower courts to consider that go beyond stare decisis and text- for example, the significance of the
interest affected, the democratic and deliberative nature of the
body that produced the rule, the nature of the group burdened,
the nature of the harm the rule produces, alternative avenues for
overcoming the rule's harsh consequences, the nature of the
harm to others if the rule is voided, and the role of empirical unknowns.
It could assert a strong presumption against disruption of
truly democratic procedures that allow for meaningful participation by the citizens most affected by the rule in question, but insist that other rules-especially ones that single out a minority of
citizens with respect to important interests that are enjoyed by
others with no comparable government restraints- be examined
more closely. Or, it might abandon formalism altogether, in favor of a Posnerian approach that pays closer attention to consequences, and less to abstract principles. 202 Finally, it might begin
all constitutional cases with the following reminder of the
Court's anti-majoritarian virtues: "[sjo long as the Court exercises the power of judicial review ... , it should not only protect
'safe' or orthodox views which rarely need its protection. " 203 This
201. This is essentially the approach favored by Justice Stevens and by Justice Thurgood Marshall. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J. concurring) ("the
two-tiered analysis ... actually appl(ies] a single standard"); San Antonio Indep. School
D1st. V. Rodngucz, 411 U.S. 1, 110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing for a
method that considers the "invidiousness" of the classification and the "importance of
the interest adversely affected by it").
202. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY passim
(2003).
203.

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
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incantation would reinforce that the Court properly corrects for
government excesses and preserves substantive and procedure
values, as a matter of institutional design and purpose. Under
this open-ended, legal realist approach, existing equal protection
and substantive due process case law would continue to frame
the Court's analysis of future cases in much the same way it now
does, but under a "tier free," nonformulaic rubric.
The primary advantage of this approach would be its transparency: it would better describe what the Supreme Court actually does when it develops doctrine. I believe the approachwhich I have called "the thin, 'constitutional law unplugged'"
strategf04 - has considerable other virtues, especially in the
arena of so-called "gay rights."
The considerable and overpowering drawbacks of this approach across the spectrum of cases, however, are at least threefold. First, the work of the lower courts is not the same as the
work of the Supreme Court. Lower courts likely are better
guided and constrained by blunt categories than by fluid, multifactored tests. Second, the "unplugged" strategy is misleading.
The Court itself relies on the blunt categories in many cases;
abandoning the tiers might mask how many cases these formulas
actually do resolve, with very little judicial reflection and virtually no dissent.
Finally, an open and unapologetic embrace of judicial flexibility could damage the Court's public credibility at a particularly inopportune moment. As the 2002 Term shows, the Court
actually does exercise restraint -and lots of it- but nevertheless
is disparaged as unduly activist by critics from multiple perspectives. If the Court were to now justify its power in more openly
realist terms, this could further obscure its inherent conservatism
in the minds of its many detractors, lower court judges might engage in more activism. There is something to be said for judicial
rhetoric that understates the judiciary's power rather than language that captures it fully. There is little good to be said,
though, for rhetoric that overstates its powers in a moment when
the Court's independence is being attacked vigorously, even
from within. Now may not be the time for the Supreme Court to
deliver a public lecture on legal realism, or even to offer a homily on the practical and enduring wisdom of a constitutional system that gives the Court power to occasionally upend official
acts.
204.

Massaro, supra note 50, at 109.
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CONCLUSION
The 2002 Term surely was a term to remember. Some of us
soared when we read the high-profile equal protection and substantive due process decisions; others already are rallying political forces and even drafting constitutional amendments to undermine them. 205 To assess the Court's performance fairly,
however, we must look beyond the front page of newspapers,
and beyond our own ideologies.
The full equal protection and substantive due process
docket revealed a Court exercising balance and prudence. It was
neither excessively activist nor excessively passive. It acted cautiously, predictably, and sanely. It invoked prevalent social practices, its own precedent, and well-established constitutional values in reaching its decisions. It clung to traditional categories
while grappling with the inevitable slippage between them. This
was a centrist-to conservative Court acting sensibly-even sensitively.
In a moment when the academic and public fashion is to
bury the judiciary, not to praise it, these redeeming features
should not go unnoticed. At the very least, we should recognize
that the sky above our democratic institutions is not fallingdespite clamors to the contrary. Nor have angels of liberty
landed in America. Lawmaking will continue after Lawrence,
Grutter, and Gratz, and- I predict-will continue to occasionally
challenge, if not utterly defy, reason.
Unlike Justice Scalia, I do look forward to litigation that
questions the rationality of official lawmaking, both in well traveled and in unfamiliar realms. Together, equal protection and
substantive due process doctrine demonstrate that a baseline expectation of rational government endures, and that passes for
reason inevitably will evolve in an unelected judiciary's hands.
More formalism here is not warranted, as some would have us
believe. Indeed, any less dynamism would ill serve democracy,
and notions of liberty, as both have been traditionally understood.
These simple lessons are worth underscoring, lest they be
drowned out by the far more riveting, impassioned descriptions

205. See Jeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003,
at.§ 6,_ 48 (predicting the backlash against "gay rights"); see also Michigan Civil Rights
Imttallve, supra note 151 (dtscussmg the political movement in Michigan to prevent any
use of race in admissions).
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of a "runaway judiciary." Hyperbolism makes great copy and
rallies political coalitions, but it obscures truth and may lead serious observers afield. The 2002 Term offers a corrective to these
exaggerated images and a reminder that existing doctrine often
grants considerable deference to democratic processes. From
this more accurate starting point, we might better engage in debates about how that doctrine might be improved, and to what
ends.

